



Profit from Crisis: Why capitalists do not want recovery, and
what that means for America
After years of recession and sluggish growth, for many, an economic recovery
is the light at the end of the tunnel that will lead to greater employment,
higher income and perhaps less inequality. While conventional economic
wisdom holds that capitalists should be just as anxious to see recovery as
workers, Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler argue that it is actually in
capitalists’ interests to prolong the crisis, as their relative power increases in
times of stagnation and unemployment. Using U.S. data from the past
century, they find that when unemployment rises, capitalists can expect their
share of income to rise in the years that follow. Unless society takes steps to decrease unemployment,
capitalists are likely to continue to pursue stagnation for their own gain.
On May 27th, Jonathan Nitzan will be speaking at the LSE Department of International Relations public lecture
“Can Capitalists Afford Recovery?” More details. 
Can it be true that capitalists pref er crisis over growth? On the f ace of  it, the idea sounds silly. According to
Economics 101, everyone loves growth, especially capitalists. Prof it and growth go hand in hand. When
capitalists prof it, real investment rises and the economy thrives, and when the economy booms the prof its
of  capitalists soar. Growth is the very lif eline of  capitalists.
Or is it?
What motivates capitalists?
The answer depends on what motivates capitalists. Conventional economic theories tell us that capitalists
are hedonic creatures. Like all other economic “agents” – f rom busy managers and hectic workers to active
criminals and idle welf are recipients – their ult imate goal is maximum utility. In order f or them to achieve this
goal, they need to maximize their prof it and interest; and this income – like any other income – depends on
economic growth. Conclusion: utility-seeking capitalists have every reason to love booms and hate crises.  
But, then, are capitalists really motivated by utility? Is it realistic to believe that large American corporations
are guided by the hedonic pleasure of  their owners – or do we need a dif f erent starting point altogether?
So try this: in our day and age, the key goal of  leading capitalists and corporations is not absolute utility
but relative power. Their real purpose is not to maximize hedonic pleasure, but to “beat the average.” Their
ult imate aim is not to consume more goods and services (although that happens too), but to increase their
power over others. And the key measure of  this power is their distributive share of  income and assets.
Note that capitalists have no choice in this matter. “Beating the average” is not a subjective pref erence but
a rigid rule, dictated and enf orced by the conf lictual nature of  the system. Capitalism pits capitalists against
other groups in society – as well as against each other. And in this multif aceted struggle f or greater power,
the yardstick is always relative. Capitalists – and the corporations they operate through – are compelled
and conditioned to accumulate differentially; to augment not their personal utility but their relative earnings.
Whether they are private owners like Warren Buf f et or institutional investors like Bill Gross, they all seek
not to perf orm but to out-perf orm – and outperf ormance means re-distribution. Capitalists who beat the
average redistribute income and assets in their f avor; this redistribution raises their share of  the total; and
a larger share of  the total means greater power stacked against others. In the f inal analysis, capitalists
accumulate not hedonic pleasure but dif f erential power.
Now, if  you look at capitalists through the lens of  relative power, the notion that they should love growth
and yearn f or recovery is no longer self -evident. In f act, the very opposite seems to be the case. For any
group to increase its relative power in society, that group must be able to strategically sabotage others in
that society. This rule derives f rom the very logic of  power relations. It means that capitalists, seeking to
augment their income-share-read-power, have to threaten or undermine the rest of  society. And one of  the
key weapons they use in this power struggle –sometimes conscientiously, though usually by def ault – is
unemployment.
Joblessness affects redistribution
Unemployment af f ects distribution mainly through the impact it has on relative prices and wages. If  higher
unemployment causes the ratio of  price to unit wage cost to decline, capitalists will f all behind in the
redistributional struggle, and this retreat is sure to make them eager f or recovery. But if  the opposite turns
out to be the case – that is, if  higher unemployment helps raise the price/wage cost ratio – capitalists
would have good reason to love crisis and indulge in stagnation.
In principle, both scenarios are possible. But as Figure 1  shows, in America the second prevails:
unemployment redistributes income systematically in f avor of  capitalists. The chart contrasts the share of
pretax prof it and net interest in domestic income on the one hand with the rate of  unemployment on the
other (both series are smoothed as 5-year moving averages). Note that the unemployment rate is lagged
three years, meaning that every observation shows the situation prevailing three years earlier.
Figure 1 – U.S. Unemployment and the Income Share of Capital
This chart does not sit well with received wisdom. Mainstream economics tells us that the two series should
be inversely correlated; that the capitalist income share should rise in the boom when unemployment f alls
and decline in the bust when unemployment rises. But that is not the case in the United States. In this
country, the correlation is posit ive, not negative. The share of  capitalists moves countercyclically: it rises in
downturns and f alls in booms – exactly the opposite of  what economic convention would have us believe.
The math is straightf orward: f or every 1 percent rise in unemployment, capitalists can expect their income
share three years later to jump by 0.8 percent. Needless to say, this equation is very bad news f or most
Americans – precisely because it is such good news f or the country’s capitalists.
Remarkably, the posit ive correlation shown in Figure 1 holds not only over the short- term business cycle,
but also in the long term. During the booming 1940s, when unemployment was very low, capitalists
appropriated a relatively small share of  domestic income. But as the boom f izzled, growth decelerated and
stagnation started to creep in, the share of  capital began to trend upward. The peak power of  capital,
measured by its overall income share, was recorded in the early 1990s, when unemployment was at post-
war highs. The neoliberal globalization that f ollowed brought lower unemployment and a smaller capital
share, but not f or long. In the late 2000s, the trend reversed again, with unemployment soaring and the
distributive share of  capital rising in tandem. Looking f orward, capitalists have reason to remain crisis-
happy: with the rate of  unemployment again approaching post-war highs, their income share has more room
to rise in the years ahead.
The power of  capitalists can also be examined f rom the viewpoint of  the inf amous Top 1 percent. Most
commentators stress the “social” and “polit ical” problems created by the disproportional wealth of  this
group, but this emphasis puts the world on its head. Redistribution is not an unf ortunate side-ef f ect of
growth and stagnation, but the main f orce driving them.
Figure 2  shows the century- long relationship between the income share of  the Top 1 percent and the
annual growth rate of  U.S. employment (with both series smoothed as 10-year moving averages). And as
the chart makes clear, the distributional gains of  this group have been boosted not by growth, but by
stagnation. The overall relationship is clearly negative. When stagnation sets in and employment growth
decelerates, the income share of  the Top 1 percent actually rises – and vice versa during a long-term boom.
Figure 2 – U.S. Income Distribution and Employment Growth
Historically, this negative relationship can be divided into three distinct periods, indicated by the dashed,
f reely drawn line going through the employment growth series. The f irst period, f rom the turn of  the
twentieth century t ill the 1930s, is the so-called Gilded Age. Income inequality is rising and employment
growth is plummeting.
The second period, f rom the Great Depression till the early 1980s, is marked by the Keynesian welf are-
warf are state. Higher taxation and public spending make distribution more equal, while employment growth
accelerates. Note the massive acceleration of  employment growth during the Second World War and its
subsequent deceleration brought by post-war demobilization. Obviously these dramatic movements were
unrelated to income inequality, but they did not alter the series’ overall upward trend.
The third period, f rom the early 1980s to the present, is marked by neoliberalism. In this period, monetarism
assumes the commanding heights, inequality soars and employment growth plummets. The current rate of
employment growth hovers around zero while the Top 1 percent appropriates 20 per cent of  all income –
similar to the numbers recorded during Great Depression.
So what do these facts mean for America? 
First, they make the f ault- lines obvious. The old slogan “what’s good f or GM is good f or America” now
rings hollow. Capitalists seek not utility through consumption but more power through redistribution. And
they achieve their goal not by raising investment and f ueling growth, but by allowing unemployment to rise
and jobs to become scarce. Clearly, we are not “all in the same boat.” There is a distributional struggle f or
power, and this struggle is not a mere “sociological” issue. It is the center of  our polit ical economy, and we
need a new theoretical f ramework to understand it.
Second, macroeconomic policy, whether old or new, cannot of f set the aggregate consequences of  this
distributional struggle. Not by a long shot. Till the late 1970s, the budget def icit was small, yet America
boomed. And why? Because progressive taxation, transf er payments and social programs made the
distribution of  income less unequal. By the early 1980s, this relationship inverted. Although the budget
def icit ballooned and interest rates f ell, economic growth decelerated. New methods of  upward
redistribution have caused the share of  the Top 1 percent to zoom, making stagnation the new norm.
Third, and f inally, Washington can no longer hide behind the bush. On the one hand, the concentration of
America’s income and assets, having been boosted by large post-crisis bailouts and massive quantitative
easing, is now at record levels. On the other hand, long-term unemployment remains at post-war highs
while job growth is at a standstill. Eventually, this situation will be reversed. The only question is whether it
will be reversed through a new policy trajectory or through the calamity of  systemic crisis.
On May 27th, Jonathan Nitzan will be speaking at the LSE Department of International Relations public lecture
“Can Capitalists Afford Recovery?” More details. 
This article was originally published in Frontline on 16 April, and is based on the paper: Shimshon Bichler and
Jonathan Nitzan, ‘Can Capitalists Afford Recovery? Economic Policy When Capital is Power’, Working Papers
on Capital as Power, No. 2013/01, October 2013, pp. 1‑36. (http://bnarchives.yorku.ca/377/) 
Featured image credit: Aschevogel (Creative Commons BY NC ND)
Please read our comments policy before commenting.          
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of USApp– American Politics and Policy,
nor of the London School of Economics. 
Shortened URL for this post:   http://bit .ly/1nN896f
 _________________________________
About the authors 
Jonathan Nitzan – York University, Toronto




Shimshon Bichler teaches polit ical economy at colleges and universit ies in Israel. All of  his
and Jonathan Nitzan’s publications are available f or f ree on The Bichler & Nitzan Archives.
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 2014 LSE USAPP
